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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.
TARA A. ROGERS,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20000812-CA

:

Priority No. 2

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (1996). The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah sentenced Defendant/Appellant Tara A. Rogers ("Appellant"
or "Rogers") and entered judgment of conviction for attempted possession of a controlled
substance, a class A misdemeanor (R. 42). A copy of the Judgment is in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION
Issue. Whether the trial judge violated due process, Appellant's right to appear
and defend, and Utah R. Crim. P. 22 when he sentenced Appellant in absentia to the
maximum sentence without affording defense counsel or the state an opportunity to speak
at sentencing.
Standard of Review. This issue involves a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness. See State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996) (issue of whether

defendant was properly sentenced in absentia involves a question of law). In addition, the
ultimate issue as to whether Appellant voluntarily absented herself from sentencing is
reviewed for correctness. See generally State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah App.
1996) (reviewing ultimate issue of whether consent to search was voluntary for
correctness). While a trial judge ordinarily has discretion in sentencing, such discretion is
not unlimited. See State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993) ( recognizing trial
court exceeds its discretion when it fails to sentence based on reliable and relevant
information, and reviewing question of whether trial judge sentenced defendant based on
reliable and relevant information as a question of law). Any underlying factual findings
are reviewed for clear error. See generally State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994)
(factual findings are reviewed for clear error).
Preservation. Neither defense counsel nor the prosecutor was afforded the
opportunity to present information relevant to the sentence or to address the issue of
whether sentencing in absentia was appropriate (R. 80:1-2); see Addendum B containing
transcript of sentencing hearing. After Judge Frederick concluded that Rogers had
waived her right to presence at sentencing, defense counsel attempted to make a record
but was interrupted by the judge (R. 80:2). Defense counsel did manage to note her
objection to sentencing in absentia before the trial judge dismissed her (R. 80:2). Within
ten days of sentencing, defense counsel filed a "Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence"
preserving the issues raised in this appeal (R. 46). A copy of that motion is in
2

Addendum C. The trial judge denied that motion (R. 51). In addition, the trial judge
entered findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the propriety of sentencing
Rogers in absentia (R. 43-44); see Addendum D. Hence, the issues raised herein are
preserved for appellate review.1
In addition, the trial judge considered the identical issue in the case immediately
prior to this case (compare R. 41 in this case, indicating that sentencing occurred on
August 4, 2000 before Judge Frederick and was recorded on tape number 1 at 9:47-9:48,
with R. 33 in State v. Hamling, Case No. 20000813-CA, currently pending before this
Court, indicating that sentencing in absentia in Hamling was held before Judge Frederick
on August 4, 2000 and was recorded on tape number 1 at 9:43-9:47). At the Hamling
sentencing, Judge Frederick noted defense counsel's objection to proceeding with
sentencing in absentia (R. 64:2 in State v. Hamling, Case No. 2000813-CA). This
previous hearing coupled with the judge's ruling, the entry of findings and conclusions,
1

The purposes of the preservation rules are to: (1) allow the trial court the
opportunity to review and correct any errors, and (2) preclude defense counsel from
foregoing objections as a matter of strategy and when the strategy does not work and
defendant is convicted, claiming error. State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 36 Utah 1989);
State v. Labrum. 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996); State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 159
(Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990). In this case where the trial judge
reviewed the issue of whether to proceed in absentia at sentencing and entered findings
and conclusions on that issue, both of those purposes were met. The trial court had the
opportunity to review the issue and correct the error, and no possible trial strategy existed
for foregoing the objection. Moreover, the trial court had the opportunity to correct the
error in proceeding in absentia as well as the error in failing to afford counsel the
opportunity to present pertinent information, when defense counsel filed a timely postjudgment motion. Accordingly, the issue was properly preserved for appeal.
3

and defendant's post-trial motion establish that the judge fully considered the issue and
the issue was preserved for review.
Alternatively, even if the issue had not been preserved, the trial judge committed
plain error in proceeding in absentia and in failing to base the sentencing decision on
relevant and reliable information without affording defense counsel the opportunity to
speak. See Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071; Utah R. Crim. P. 22; State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d
1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) (plain error occurs when an error is obvious and prejudices
the defendant). Under Johnson and Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a), the error in failing to conduct
a full sentencing hearing was obvious as was the denial of Rogers' right to presence at
sentencing under Article I, section 12, Utah Constitution. The obvious error prejudiced
Rogers since she received the maximum sentence when she otherwise was a candidate for
probation; see discussion infra at 11-12.
Additionally, exceptional circumstances require review of this issue. See State v.
Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah App. 1996). Utah R. Evid. 22(a) mandates that a trial judge
afford defendant the opportunity to provide relevant information at sentencing; due
process requires the judge to conduct a full and fair sentencing hearing. Where the judge
does not afford counsel the opportunity to speak and does not conduct a full and fair
sentencing hearing, a procedural anomaly requiring review exists. See id. (exceptional
circumstances doctrine generally applies to rare procedural anomalies). The question of
whether the trial judge imposed a legal sentence is of extraordinary importance and
4

widespread interest as evidenced by the number of cases before this Court raising a
similar issue. Id. (doctrine of exceptional circumstances may be applied where "matters
of extraordinary importance or widespread interest" exist).2 Without appellate review, the
egregious violation of due process, Rule 22 and the right to presence which occurred in
this case would go unchecked. In this case where the trial judge had the obligation to
conduct a full and fair sentencing hearing and failed to do so, exceptional circumstances
require that this Court review the issue on appeal.
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of the following rules and constitutional provision is in Addendum E:
UtahR.Crim. 17(a)(2);
Utah R. Crim. P. 22;
Utah Const, art. I, § 7;
Utah Const, art. I, § 12;
U.S. Const, amend. XIV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 19 , 2000, the state charged Rogers with unlawful possession of a
controlled substance, to-wit: cocaine, a third degree felony ( R. 05-06). On June 20,
2000, Rogers pled guilty to attempted unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a
2

Some of the cases before this Court in which the trial judge in this case
sentenced the defendant in absentia to the maximum sentence without affording counsel
an opportunity to present relevant information include: State v. Payne, Case No.
20000497-CA (oral argument scheduled for February 23, 2000); State v. WanosiL
Case No. 20000541-CA (oral argument scheduled for February 23, 2000); State v.
Samora, Case No. 20000884-CA (opening brief filed); and State v. Vicente, Case No.
20000955-CA.
5

class A misdemeanor, before the Honorable William W. Barrett (R. 79). A copy of the
transcript of the plea hearing is in Addendum F. Judge Barrett scheduled sentencing for
August 4, 2000 before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick and referred Rogers for a
presentence report (R. 79:5-6). When Rogers failed to appear at sentencing on August 4,
2000, Judge Frederick sentenced her to the maximum one year sentence (R. 80).
On August 9, 2000, the trial judge signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
(R. 43). See Addendum D. On August 10, 2000, defense counsel filed a motion to
correct the sentence (R. 46-47); see Addendum C. On August 30, 2000, the trial judge
denied the motion to correct the sentence by signed minute entry (R. 51). In addition,
Rogers was booked into jail on August 30, 2000. Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal on August 31, 2000 (R. 62).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
According to the probable cause statement in the Information, a West Valley
police officer stopped a vehicle for broken taillights (R. 08). Rogers was a passenger in
that vehicle (R. 08). Rogers "was looking for the license plate in the trunk of her vehicle,
and at the same time, she began placing her hands inside the pockets of her pants and
jacket. Officer Crandall observed a white plastic object on the ground at the defendant's
feet. It was a baggie of white powdery substance, later field-tested positive for cocaine"
(R. 08).
Rogers had lived at the same address in Taylorsville, Utah for eighteen years
6

(R. 12). She lived at that address with her mother and father (R. 12). She had lived in the
area her entire life, and, as a personal reference, she listed a neighbor whom she had
known for twenty-two years (R. 12).
After Rogers pled guilty, Judge Barrett ordered that a presentence report be
prepared and scheduled sentencing before Judge Frederick (R. 79:5-6). On July 21, 2000,
Judge Frederick revoked Rogers' release and issued an arrest warrant because Rogers had
not appeared for preparation of a presentence report (R. 38-39). The arrest warrant listed
the address in Taylorsville where Rogers had lived for eighteen years (R. 39).
On August 4, 2000, Rogers did not appear at sentencing (R. 80:2). Without
affording either party the opportunity to address the propriety of sentencing Rogers in
absentia or present information relevant to the appropriate sentence, Judge Frederick
summarily concluded that Rogers had voluntarily absented herself and sentenced Rogers
to the maximum one year sentence (R. 80:2-3); see Addendum B.
Rogers was arrested on August 29, 2000 and booked into the Salt Lake County Jail
on August 30, 2000 (R. 54). On September 7, 2000, the court filed a letter from Rogers
in which she apologized for not appearing at sentencing, and asked the trial court to
review her sentence (R. 71).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial judge violated Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and due process by failing to afford
the parties an opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing and by otherwise
7

failing to base the sentence on relevant information or to conduct a full and fair
sentencing hearing. Imposing a maximum sentence based solely on the failure to appear
without considering the nature and circumstances of the crime, defendant's background or
society's interests and without affording the parties the opportunity to present information
relevant to sentencing violates the rule and due process and requires a new sentencing
hearing.
The trial judge further violated due process, the right to presence, and the Rules of
Criminal Procedure by sentencing Appellant in absentia. Appellant did not knowingly
waive her right to presence at sentencing in this case where she was not informed that she
would be sentenced even if she were not present. The critical role of presence at
sentencing requires that the right to presence not be lightly forfeited. In this case where
Appellant did not waive her right to be present at sentencing, the trial court erred in
sentencing her in absentia and the sentence must be vacated.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT SENTENCED APPELLANT IN ABSENTIA TO THE
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE SENTENCE WITHOUT ANY INPUT
FROM EITHER PARTY.
Judge Frederick began the sentencing proceeding by pointing out, "this is
apparently another one of these absentia cases, right?" (R. 80:2). Without affording either
party an opportunity to speak regarding the propriety of sentencing Rogers in absentia,

8

give a legal reason for not proceeding with sentencing or present information relevant to
sentencing, Judge Frederick then stated:
The - - this Court will determine that she has likewise voluntarily absented
herself from these proceedings. She was advised both orally and in writing
to appear before this Court, as - - on today's date, as well as appear at
A.C.E.C, for reasons not known to whatever - whoever the clerk was who
referred her. She did not appear there, a warrant was previously issued for
her arrest. No further contact has been made with her, therefore I will
determine that she's voluntarily absented herself from these proceedings.
And I will order, based upon her failure to comply with the terms and
conditions of this Court's previous order, that she be committed to the Salt
Lake County Detention Center forthwith for the period of one year . . . .
(R. 80:2-3). The prosecutor thereafter prepared findings of fact and conclusions of law, a
copy of which is in Addendum D, which focused solely on the voluntariness of Rogers'
failure to appear and did not address whether she knowingly waived her right to presence
(R. 43-44).
A. THE TRIAL JUDGE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND UTAH R.
CRIM. P. 22 WHEN HE SENTENCED ROGERS TO THE MAXIMUM
SENTENCE WITHOUT CONSIDERING RELEVANT AND RELIABLE
INFORMATION AND WITHOUT AFFORDING THE PARTIES THE
OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK AT SENTENCING.
The state and federal due process clauses "require[] that a sentencing judge act on
reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing sentence."
State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985): see also Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071 (state
and federal due process protections applicable to sentencing require that judge make
sentencing decision based on reliable and relevant information). A sentence which is not
9

based on reliable and relevant information violates due process and must be vacated. See
id. at 1071-75 (vacating sentence based on unreliable hearsay report).
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) further attempts to effectuate the due process requirement
of a full and fair sentencing hearing based on relevant and reliable information by
requiring sentencing judges to give both the defendant and the prosecutor an opportunity
to present any information which might be material to the sentence. Utah R. Crim. P.
22(a) states in part:
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an
opportunity to make a statement and to present information in mitigation of
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be
imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to
present any information material to the imposition of sentence.
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) (emphasis added); see Howelh 707 P.2d at 118 (n[t]o ensure
fairness in the sentencing procedure, [Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a)] directs trial courts to hear
evidence from both the defendant and the prosecution that is relevant to the sentence to be
imposed").
The plain language of Rule 22(a) places on the trial court the responsibility to
afford defense counsel the opportunity to speak at sentencing and to present information
relevant to sentencing.3 While Rule 22(a) mandates that the trial court give the parties the
opportunity to speak at sentencing, due process as outlined in Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071,

3

Where a defendant is represented by counsel, defendant presents information
through defense counsel.
10

requires that any sentence imposed by a trial judge be based on reliable and relevant
information. Working together, Rule 22(a) and due process require a trial judge to make
sure that a fair and full sentencing hearing which meets due process requirements occurs.
In this case, the trial court did not afford defense counsel or the prosecutor the
opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing. Failure to hold a full
sentencing hearing and the concomitant failure to base the sentencing decision on
complete and accurate information requires a new sentencing hearing pursuant to
Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071-75. In a case such as the present one where the trial judge did
not afford defense counsel or the prosecutor the opportunity to present information
pertinent to the sentencing decision, conducting a harmless error review would undermine
the due process requirement of a full and fair sentencing hearing. Since defense counsel
was not given the opportunity to present relevant information, complete information
favorable to the defendant is not in the record. Moreover, the prosecutor may have been
aware of mitigating circumstances and requested a less severe sentence; that information
would likewise not be in the record since the prosecutor was not afforded the opportunity
to speak. Reviewing the record under these circumstances to determine whether the
missing information would have impacted on the sentence would be ludicrous where the
parties were not afforded the opportunity to include that information in the record.
Even if this Court were to attempt a review for prejudice, however, the record in
this case demonstrates harm caused by the court's failure to afford counsel the
11

opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing. The record demonstrates that
the crime was a relatively minor possession of a controlled substance charge. No
violence was involved and nothing in the record indicates that Rogers has a history of
violence. The record suggests that drug treatment and probation rather than incarceration
for the maximum period would be the appropriate sentence and best serve society's
interests. In fact, while the record does not contain any indication of criminal charges
against Rogers prior to the incident in this case, it suggests that her life had taken a turn
after the charges in this case were filed, and that treatment and the intervention caused by
probation might reverse that downward turn (compare R. 12 on March 13, 2000 with
R. 16 on June 8, 2000). Additionally, Rogers lived with her parents, had been employed
and appears from the record to be precisely the type of person judges place on probation.
Had the judge been fully aware of the circumstances, probation, not the maximum
sentence, would have been likely in this case.
Rogers' nonappearance at sentencing does not alter the likelihood that she would
not have received the maximum sentence. First, failing to appear at sentencing is
punishable by other means and should not enter into the sentencing decision. For
example, a defendant who fails to appear at sentencing can be charged with a separate
crime or held on a bench warrant after not appearing. In addition, if the judge sentences a
defendant in absentia, the defendant loses the right to allocution which can play an
important role in mitigating sentence; see discussion infra at 15-27 regarding impropriety
12

absentia. In this case, Judge Frederick clearly indicated that he based his decision to
impose the maximum sentence on Rogers' failure to appear at sentencing (R. 80:2-3). In
so doing, he failed to consider the nature and circumstances of the crime, Rogers'
background and society's interests. See State v. McClendon. 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah
1980) (sentence must be based on nature of crime, defendant's background and interests
of society).
Common sense dictates that imposing a maximum sentence based solely on a
failure to appear at sentencing can result in sentences which are not appropriate in light of
society's interests, the nature of the crime or the defendant's background, and which
impact profoundly on criminal justice resources. Filling the jail with misdemeanants
serving maximum sentences who are irresponsible regarding their court dates but who
otherwise do not present a threat to society nor deserve severe punishment makes little
sense. Instead, the sentencing decision is more appropriately based on a complete review
of the nature of the crime and the background of the defendant.
Additionally, even if nonappearance at sentencing were considered in determining
the appropriate sentence, it would be only one of several factors to be considered.
M

A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in light of his

background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society which
underlie the criminal justice system." McClendon, 611 P.2d at 729. In other words,
pursuant to McClendon, Johnson and due process, a sentence must be based not only on
13

the circumstances of the crime, but also on other factors such as the defendant's
background and the interests of society. The crime in this case where Rogers possessed
cocaine for personal use was relatively minor. Nothing suggests that Rogers has an
extensive criminal background. Even if society had a minimal interest in punishing
people who fail to appear at sentencing through harsher sentences4, society's greater
interest in this case is to attempt to change the behavior through treatment and probation.
In this case where the nature and circumstances of the crime, Rogers' background and
society's interests all weigh in favor of probation, Rogers was prejudiced by the trial
court's failure to conduct a full and fair sentencing hearing.
As a final matter, while the issue was preserved based on the trial judge's ruling at
sentencing and Rogers' post-trial motion on which the trial judge also ruled, even if this
issue had not been preserved for appellate review, it nevertheless was plain error
requiring that the sentence be vacated. The error in failing to afford defense counsel the
opportunity to speak on behalf of her client and in otherwise failing to base the sentencing
decision on reliable and relevant information was obvious in light of Rule 22(a) and
Johnson. See generally Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09 (plain error occurs where error is

4

Appellant maintains that a defendant's failure to appear should not be part of the
sentencing consideration, and is better addressed through measures other than increasing
the sentence. Because the judge can issue a bench warrant and hold a person for several
days who was otherwise free on release, failures to appear are adequately addressed
through the issuance of a bench warrant. Moreover, in extreme cases, the state can file
charges when a defendant fails to appear.
14

obvious and prejudices defendant). The obviousness of the error in failing to afford
counsel the opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing is bolstered by Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7) (1999) which mandates that the trial judge receive any
information regarding the appropriate sentence which the parties desire to present, and
that such information "be presented in open court on the record and in the presence of the
defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7).
While this due process error requires vacation of the sentence regardless of
whether prejudice is apparent in the record (see discussion supra at 10-11), even if
prejudice were required, the record demonstrates that Rogers was harmed by the judge's
failure to conduct a full and fair sentencing hearing. As outlined supra at 11-12, the error
in failing to afford defense counsel the opportunity to present information relevant to
sentencing prejudiced Rogers since the trial judge was not fully informed of the nature
and circumstances of the crime or Rogers' background. Had the trial judge been fully
informed and considered all relevant and reliable information, probation would have been
the appropriate sentence.
Exceptional circumstances also require review of this issue. See Irwin. 924 P.2d
at 11. The irregular procedure which occurred in this case whereby the judge sentenced
Rogers in absentia without affording either party the opportunity to speak is an
exceptional circumstance which requires review; see discussion supra at 4-5. Without

15

review, the flagrant violation of Rogers' right to due process which occurred in this case
would not be scrutinized nor corrected.
B. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND UTAH R.
CRIM. P. 22 BY SENTENCING ROGERS IN ABSENTIA.
In addition to failing to comply with Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and due process in
conducting the sentencing hearing without affording counsel the opportunity to present
relevant information, Judge Frederick violated Rule 22, due process and Article I,
section 12, Utah Constitution by sentencing Rogers in absentia. Article I, section 12,
Utah Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee
the right to be present at sentencing. See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109-10; United States v.
McPherson, 421 F.2d 1127, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Because the right to presence at
sentencing is constitutionally guaranteed, the trial judge may not proceed in absentia
unless the defendant waives the right to presence.
1. The Record Does Not Demonstrate a Knowing Waiver of the Right to
Presence at Sentencing; Rogers Was Not Informed That the Sentencing
Would Occur If She Was Not Present and It Cannot Be Assumed That
Rogers Would Have Known That She Would Be Sentenced in Absentia If
She Did Not Appear.
Any waiver of the right to be present at sentencing "must be voluntary and involve
an intentional relinquishment of a known right." Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110 (further
citation omitted). The burden is on the state to establish waiver, and a knowing and
voluntary waiver may not be presumed by the trial court. State v. Houtz. 714 P.2d 677,
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678-79 (Utah 1986).
In order to knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to presence at sentencing, the
defendant must, at the very least, be given notice of the proceedings. Anderson. 929 P.2d
at 1110. In addition, the directive given the defendant must provide sufficient warning
that the hearing will proceed even if the defendant is not present for a knowing waiver of
the right to presence to occur. McPherson, 421 F.2d at 1129-30.
In Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111, the Supreme Court held that sentencing the
defendant in absentia did not violate the defendant's right to allocution where the
defendant was informed of the trial date and signed a written waiver of his right to be
present. Id. at 1110-11. The Court recognized that the right to allocution at sentencing
"is an inseparable part of the right to be present" found in Article I, section 12, Utah
Constitution. Id. at 1111. Anderson waived his right to allocution by his voluntary
absence after being informed of the trial date, his execution of a written waiver of his
right to be present, his failure to appear at trial, and his failure to keep in touch with
counsel or appear at sentencing. Id. at 1110-11.
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Anderson is consistent with the McPherson
approach of requiring that the defendant be informed that the proceeding will be held
without him in order to have a knowing waiver5, and must be read in light of the facts and
5

McPherson focused on the nature of the communication with the defendant, i.e.
on whether the defendant was informed the hearing would proceed in his absence, in
determining whether the defendant knowingly waived his right to presence. McPherson.
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policy considerations relevant to the circumstances under which Anderson failed to
appear. Because Anderson was warned of the consequences of failing to appear and had
signed a written waiver of his right to presence in which he agreed to be tried in absentia,
requiring that the defendant be warned of the consequences of nonappearance in order to
find a knowing waiver of the right to presence fits squarely within the Anderson holding.
See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. Relying on McPherson, the Anderson court stated, "[t]o
intentionally relinquish the right to be present, the defendant must have notice of the
proceedings.n L± (citing McPherson, 421 F.2d at 1130). Since the notice required in
McPherson was that sentencing would proceed without the defendant if he did not appear,
this reliance on McPherson in Anderson requires that the defendant be given notice that
the sentencing will occur even if he does not appear in order to sentence in absentia.
Requiring that a defendant be informed that sentencing will proceed without him
for there to be a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to presence is also consistent
with United States Supreme Court case law regarding trials in absentia pursuant to Fed.
R. Crim. P. 43. See Crosby v. United States. 506 U.S. 255, 256, 113 S.Ct. 748, 749, 122
L.Ed.2d 25 (1993). In Crosby, the Court recognized that it cannot be assumed that a
defendant who fails to appear knows that a trial will go on without him. In fact, ,K[s]ince
421 F.2d at 1129-30. In fact, although the trial judge in McPherson made it clear that
defendant was to be present at sentencing and that serious consequences would occur if
he was not, the appellate court concluded that a knowing waiver of the right to presence
did not occur where the record did not show that the defendant was informed that the trial
would proceed without him. Id.
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the notion that trial may be commenced in absentia still seems to shock most lawyers, it
would hardly seem appropriate to impute knowledge that this will occur to their clients."
Crosby, 506 U.S. at 261 (citation omitted). Moreover, while under the federal rules, a
trial may continue to conclusion when a defendant disappears after the trial has begun, a
trial in absentia is not permitted if the defendant fails to appear at the beginning of trial.
Id. at 262 (citing Taylor v. United States. 414 U.S.17 (1973)). In making a distinction
between absenting oneself mid-trial and not appearing at the beginning of trial for
purposes of determining whether a defendant waived his right to presence, the Supreme
Court recognized that a defendant who flees mid-trial knows that the trial has begun and
will proceed without him whereas a defendant who does not appear at the beginning of
trial has no such knowledge. Hence, while a knowing waiver of the right to presence
occurs when a defendant flees mid-trial, a knowing waiver is not demonstrated when the
defendant fails to appear at all because the nonappearing defendant did not know that the
trial would proceed without him.
Although Anderson supports the McPherson approach, it also fails to control the
issue before this Court because it involved circumstances which are different from those
in the present case. The trial court properly tried Anderson in absentia based on a written
waiver of the right to presence. In determining whether the subsequent sentencing could
also be conducted in absentia, the Court looked to cases involving similar circumstances
where a defendant was properly tried in absentia and had not shown up by the time of
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sentencing. Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1110. Because it would create an anomaly to be able
to try in absentia a defendant who affirmatively waived his right to presence but then be
unable to sentence him, the Supreme Court held that sentencing Anderson in absentia
after he had expressly waived his right to presence at trial was appropriate. Id. The
Anderson court did not consider the current circumstances, however, where a defendant
appeared at the plea hearing but was not informed that sentencing would occur without
her, then later failed to appear at sentencing.
Moreover, because presence of the defendant at sentencing is even more critical
than it is at trial, the right to presence at sentencing cannot be lightly forfeited. See
United States v. Turner. 532 F. Supp. 913, 915 (1982); State v. Fettis. 664 P.2d 208, 209
(Ariz. 1983). "[T]he common law has traditionally required that the defendant be present
at his sentencing." Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915; United States v. Lastra. 973 F.2d 952,
955 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citation omitted) ("The requirement that the defendant be present
when sentence is passed has deep common law origins.'"). Presence is of critical
importance to sentencing not only because it allows the judge to be presented with all of
the information needed for a full and fair sentencing, but also because it allows the judge
to question and admonish the defendant. Indeed, "[i]t is only when the defendant is
before the court that a reasonable and rational sentencing can take place." Fettis, 664
P.2d at 209.
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Presence is of instrumental value to the defendant for the exercise of other
rights, such as to present mitigating evidence and challenge aggravating
evidence, and it may also be advantageous to him that the decision maker
be required to face him. The state may have an interest in the presence of
the defendant in order that the example of personal admonition might deter
others from similar crimes. Moreover, it may sometimes be important that
the convicted man be called to account publicly for what he has done, not to
be made an instrument of the general deterrent, but to acknowledge
symbolically his personal responsibility for his acts and to receive
personally the official expression of society's condemnation for his
conduct. The ceremonial rendering of judgment may also contribute to the
individual deterrent force of the sentence if the latter is accompanied by
appropriate judicial comment on the defendant's crime.
Turner. 532 F. Supp. at 915.
Presence of the defendant at sentencing also preserves the dignity of the
individuals being sentenced as well as the court and the system itself.
Respect for the dignity of the individual is at the base of the right of a man
to be present when society authoritatively proceeds to decide and announce
whether it will deprive him of liberty. It shows a fundamental lack of
respect for the dignity of a man to sentence him in absentia. The presence
of the defendant indicates that society has sufficient confidence in the
justness of its judgment to announce it in public to the convicted man
himself. Presence thus enhances the legitimacy and acceptability of both
sentence and conviction.
Turner. 532 F. Supp. at 915-16 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The important
policy considerations relating to presence at sentencing require that the right to presence
at sentencing not be easily waived. See id. at 915 (important policy considerations
supporting right to presence at sentencing "militate against a rule allowing presence at
sentencing to be lightly waived").
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Because of the critical importance of presence to sentencing, many jurisdictions
refuse to allow sentencing in absentia except in extraordinary circumstances. Fettis, 664
P.2d at 209. Such extraordinary circumstances, while "rare indeed" (id.), may include
circumstances where a defendant has expressly waived his right to be present at
sentencing. See Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 916 (citation omitted). Extraordinary
circumstances allowing sentencing in absentia may also include circumstances where the
defendant has been fully informed that sentencing will proceed in his absence if he does
not appear at the sentencing hearing. See Lowerv v. State, 759 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Ark.
1988) (court unwilling to find defendant waived the right to presence at sentencing "in the
absence of language specifically advising an accused that he is subject to being sentenced
prospectively without his being present"); People v. Link, 685 N.E.2d 624, 626 (111. App.
1997) (court requires that defendant must be "warned his failure to appear may result in
the proceedings continuing in absentia" in order to sentence a defendant in absentia);
People v. Bennett, 557 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (court reasons that
sentencing in absentia was permissible where defendant was fully advised that sentencing
would occur in his absence if he failed to appear); People v. Harris, 564 N.Y.S.2d 481
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (same); People v. Christopher R., 522 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1987) (same). These cases support the notion that at the very least, a defendant must be
informed that the sentencing will occur even if he is not present in order to knowingly
waive his right to presence.
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While Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) facilitates due process and the Article I, section 12,
Utah Constitution right to appear and defend by allowing defendant to speak and present
information relevant to sentencing, Rule 22(b) allows sentencing to proceed even though
the defendant is not present ff[o]n the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in
defendant's absence." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(b). The grounds on which a defendant may
be tried in his absence are circumstances where the defendant has knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to presence; in the context of sentencing, a knowing waiver
does not occur unless the defendant has been informed that the sentencing will proceed
even if he is not present.
Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2), which recognizes that in order to proceed in absentia at
trial, the defendant must voluntarily waive his right to presence, does not affect the
determination of whether the constitutional right to presence at sentencing was waived in
this case. Utah R. Crim P. 17(a)(2) states in part, ff[i]n prosecutions for offenses not
punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to
defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or
judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present."
While this rule suggests that voluntary absence from trial after notice of the time for trial
constitutes a waiver of the right to presence at trial, it does not outline what constitutes a
knowing waiver of the right to presence at sentencing. In other words, while either
sentencing or trial can proceed without the defendant "on the same grounds," i.e. on the
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grounds that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to presence, the
circumstances establishing a knowing waiver may differ, given their distinct roles on a
criminal case.
More importantly, even if Rule 17(a)(2) applied to sentencing hearings rather than
trial, the Article I, section 12 right to presence at sentencing would override the rule.
Because of the greater importance of presence at sentencing, the fundamental, common
law roots in requiring presence at sentencing and the lack of awareness by most people
that a sentencing will be held if the defendant is not present, the right to presence at
sentencing cannot be waived except in extraordinary circumstances which may include
circumstances where the defendant was informed that the sentencing would be held even
if he did not appear.
In the present case where Rogers was not informed that she would be sentenced
even if she did not appear at sentencing, Rogers did not knowingly waive her right to
presence at sentencing.6 The trial judge therefore erred in sentencing Rogers in absentia
and the sentence must be vacated.

6

In Rogers' note to the judge after she was booked into jail following sentencing,
she stated in part, "I could give you several valid reasons why I missed my sentencing,
but in retrospect there is not excuse" (R. 71). Her reasons for missing sentencing are not
listed. While this note arguably addresses whether Rogers' absence was voluntary, in the
absence of her reasons for missing court, the note does not establish that her absence was
voluntary. The trial court improperly presumed a voluntary absence based solely on
Rogers' failure to appear. Moreover, the note in no way suggests that Rogers had
knowledge that she would be sentenced in absentia if she did not appear (R. 71).
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2. The Public Interest Did Not Require That Rogers Be Sentenced in
Absentia.
In determining whether the right to presence has been waived thereby allowing for
sentencing in absentia, a trial court must also weigh whether the public interest in
proceeding without the defendant outweighs the defendant's interest in being present.
See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111 (court relies on practical considerations which supported
proceeding with the sentencing in absentia); United States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33, 36
(2d Cir. 1989) (court considers whether public interest in proceeding with sentencing in
absentia outweighed defendant's interest in being present in deciding whether to uphold
sentencing in absentia).
In Anderson, the Supreme Court upheld the sentencing in absentia after concluding
that "[practical considerations . . . mitigate[d] in favor of in absentia sentencing.11
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111. Anderson had executed a written waiver of his right to be
present, then left the state. The Court was concerned that Anderson could absent himself
for years "and the eventual sentencing would have to be performed by a judge who was
unfamiliar with the case and had no access to relevant information." Id.
Concerns about dilatory defendants who attempt to delay the administration of
justice by failing to appear at sentencing are remedied by requiring trial judges to exercise
their discretion to proceed in absentia by balancing "the public interest in proceeding
[without the defendant]" against the defendant's interest in being present. Smith v. Mann,
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173 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1999), cert denied, 120 S.Ct. 200; see also Fontanez, 878 F.2d at
36-37; People v. Parker. 440 N.E.2d 131, 137 (N.Y. 1982). Requiring that trial courts
balance the public interest in proceeding against the defendant's interest in being present
ensures that trial courts "vigorously safeguard" the right to presence. Fontanez, 878 F.2d
at 36.
The factors to be considered when balancing the public interest in proceeding in
absentia against the defendant's interest in being present include whether there is a
possibility that the defendant could be contacted and brought to court within a reasonable
amount of time, the difficulty in rescheduling the sentencing hearing, the burden on the
state in not proceeding, and whether there is a possibility that information relevant to
sentencing will be lost. See Parker, 440 N.E.2d at 1317; Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 36;
Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1111.
In this case, Judge Frederick erred in sentencing Rogers in absentia where the
judge did not balance the public interest in proceeding against Rogers' interest in being
present, and the record fails to demonstrate that the public interest required that Rogers be
sentenced in absentia. Rogers could have been easily contacted since she had lived in the
same place for eighteen years (R. 12). In fact, she was picked up and booked less than a
month after sentencing (R. 53). Continuing the sentencing hearing to another date would
not have been difficult; sentencing hearings take a relatively short amount of time and are
often rescheduled. The state would not have been burdened by a continuance since it
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presented no information pertinent to sentencing; the state could have easily done the
same thing if the sentencing had been rescheduled, and there was no threat that
information relevant to sentencing would be lost if sentencing were rescheduled. Since
Judge Frederick had taken the case from another judge, was not present when the plea
was taken and had no specific knowledge that would be lost, the public had no interest in
maintaining him as the judge; even if a delay in sentencing caused reassignment of the
case, information pertinent to sentencing would not be lost and the effective
administration of justice would not be undermined since Judge Frederick did not sit
through the trial as the Anderson judge had, and did not take the plea.
Moreover, the public interest would have been better served by continuing the
sentencing hearing so that Rogers could be present. Requiring Rogers to "account
publicly" for her crime and take responsibility before the judge for her actions would
better serve society's interest in seeking no future criminal behavior from Rogers. See
Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915. In addition, "[t]he ceremonial rendering of judgment may
also contribute to the individual deterrent force of the sentence" (id), thereby furthering
society's interest in having the sentence deter future criminal conduct. The integrity of
the system and respect for the individual would also have been served by continuing
sentencing rather than sentencing Rogers in absentia. In this case, Rogers' presence at
sentencing would have actually furthered society's interests while also protecting her
right to presence.
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Rogers' fundamental, critical interest in being present for sentencing was not
outweighed by the public interest in proceeding. The trial judge therefore erred in
sentencing Rogers absentia and the sentence must be vacated.
CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Tara A. Rogers respectfully requests that this Court vacate
her sentence and remand her case for a new sentencing hearing.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this U^fu day of January, 2001.

\JQAL

C. ultty

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

NISA J. SISNEROS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 001906958 FS

TARA AADELE ROGERS,
Defendant.
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail

Judge:
Date:

J. DENNIS FREDERICK
Auaust 4, 2000

PRESENT
Clerk:
cindyb
Prosecutor: BOWN, GREGORY L.
Defendant not present
Defendant's Attorney(s): SISNEROS, NISA J
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: July 31, 1977
Video
Tape Number:
1
Tape Count: 9:47-9:48
CHARGES
1. ATTEMPTED ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 06/20/2000 Guilty Plea
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED ILLEGAL POSS/USE
OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 1 year(s)
Commitment is to begin immediately.

Page 1

00041

Case No: 001906958
Date:
Aug 04, 2000

The Court finds the defendant has voluntarily absented herself from
the sentencing proceedings and the Court orders the defendant be
committed forthwith upon her arrest. Counsel for the State to
prepare the findings of fact and conclusions of law and

Page 2 (last)
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ADDENDUM B

1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH

2

SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

3

-oOo-

4

STATE OF UTAH,

6
7

Case NO. 001906958FS

Plaintiff,

5

SENTENCING

vs.

(Videotape Proceedings)

TARA AADELE ROGERS,
Defendant.

8

-oOo-

9
10

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 4th day of August,

11
12

2000, commencing at the hour of 9:47 a.m., the above-

13

entitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE

14

J. DENNIS FREDERICK, sitting as Judge in the above-named

15

Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the

16

following videotape proceedings were had.

17

-oOo-

18

A P P E A R A N C E S

19

For the State:

GREGORY L. BOWN
Deputy Salt Lake County
District Attorney
231 East 400 South, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

For the Defendant:

NISA J. SISNEROS
Attorney at Law
Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake city, Utah 84111
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2

3
4

MS. SISNEROS:
No. 1 7 .

5
6

THE COURT:

Very well. Ms. Sisneros, this is

apparently another one of these absentia cases; right?

7

MS. SISNEROS:

8

THE COURT:

9

And my l a s t m a t t e r i s Tara R o g e r s ,

Correct.

This is State of Utah vs. Tara Aadele

Rogers, Case No. CR006958.

Ms. Sisneros appearing for the

10

defendant, Mr. Bown for the State.

11

not present.

12

Tara Aadele Rogers is

The—this Court will determine that she has

13

likewise voluntarily absented herself from these

14

proceedings.

15

appear before this Court, as—on today's date, as well as

16

appear at A.C.E.C., for reasons best known to whatever the-

17

-whoever the clerk was who referred her.

18

appear there, a warrant was previously issued for her

19

arrest.

20

therefore, I will determine that she's voluntarily absented

21

herself from these proceedings.

22

She was advised both orally and in writing to

She did not

No further contact has been made with her,

And I will order, based upon her failure to

23

comply with the terms and conditions of this Court's

24

previous order, that she be committed to the Salt Lake

25

County Adult Detention Center forthwith for the period of

1

one year , for the Class A misdemeanor crime of attempted

2

possession of a controlled substance, to which she pled

3

guilty to on the 20th of June of this year.

4
5

And the order of commitment will be forthwith
upon her arrest on the no bail warrant previously issued.

6

Thank you, Ms. Sisneros.

7

MS. SISNEROS: And just for the record, I would

8
9

note my objection—
THE COURT: Yes.

10

MS. SISNEROS:

—for sentencing in absentia.

11

THE COURT:

12

MS. SISNEROS:

13

I have. May I please be excused?

And thank you.
Thank you, your Honor.

Yes.

That's all

14

THE COURT:

You may.

15

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

16
17

* * *

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss.

I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify:
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith,
Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court
Transcriber of Tape Recorded Court Proceedings; that I
received an electronically recorded videotape of the within
matter and under his supervision have transcribed the same
into typewriting, and the foregoing pages, numbered from 1
to 3, inclusive, to the best of my ability constitute a
full, true and correct transcription, except where it is
indicated the Videotape Recorded Court Proceedings were
inaudible.
I do further certify that I am not counsel,
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 12th day of
September, 2000.

-J&-/VC KJ?ttj
Transcriber
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day
of September, 2000.
HOTARY PUBLIC
ALAN P. SMITH
385 BRAHMA DRIVE
MURRAY, UT 84107
COMMISSION EXPIRES
DEC. 4, 2001
STATE OF UTAH

(

S E A L )

tf.VvsMi/ '/>h*/fh-

Notary Public

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:
)

ss.

I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter§
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape
Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of
Utah, do certify that I received an electronically recorded
videotape of the within matter and caused the same to be
transcribed into typewriting, and that the foregoing pages,
numbered from 1 to 3, inclusive, to the best of my
knowledge, constitute a full, true and correct
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible.
I do further certify that I am not counsel,
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this JLlth day of
September, 2000.
NOTARY PUBLIC
ALAN P SMITH
385 BRAHMA DRIVE
MURRAY, UT 84107
COMMISSION EXPIRES
DEC. 4, 2001
STATE OF UTAH

( S E A L )
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Notary Public"
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO CORRECT
ILLEGAL SENTENCE

Plaintiff,
-vTARA A. ROGERS,

CaseNo.001906958FS
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK

Defendant.

Defendant, Tara A. Rogers, by and through counsel, Nisa J. Sisneros, hereby moves the court
to correct it's illegal sentence imposed on August 4,2000 pursuant to Rule 22(e) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, State v. Waestaff. 772 P.2d 987 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and State v.
Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1996). Ms. Rogers was not present at the sentencing. The court
found that she had voluntarily absented herselffromthe proceedings and sentenced her to the
maximum jail sentence allowed by law. However, Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure states a defendant is entitled to "make a statement and to present any mitigation of
punishment, or show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed". Any imposition of
sentence without Ms. Rogers' presence violated her rights to due process and to allocution as
found in the Constitution of Utah art. I, §§ 7 & 12, and the 5th, 8th and 14th Amendments of the
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United States Constitution. At the time of sentencing the court was unaware as to why Ms.
Rogers was not present. The court made the assumption that any absence was voluntary.
Rule 22 (b) allows the court to issue a bench warrant if a defendant fails to appear for
sentencing. Therefore, Ms. Rogers requests that the court correct it's sentence and issue a bench
warrant for her arrest allowing her to address the court prior to being sentenced.
Ms. Rogers requests the court set this matter for hearing.

DATED this 10th day 6f August, 2000.

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office,
231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this

day of August, 2000.
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ADDENDUM D

NUIIBJSTBICT COURT
Third Judicial District

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
GREGORY L. BOWN, 0402
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND ORDER

-vsCase No. 001906958
TARA A. ROGERS,
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick
Defendant.
The above-entitled case came before this Court for sentencing on August 4, 2000. The
State of Utah was represented by its counsel, Gregory L. Bown, Deputy District Attorney, and
the defendant, who was not present was represented by Nina Sisneros.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On June 15, 2000, defendant entered a guilty plea in the above-entitled matter to
Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A misdemeanor, before Judge William
W. Barrett. Defendant, who was present with counsel, was referred to ACEC for a presentence
report and was given the sentencing date of August 4, 2000, at 8:30 AM before the Honorable J.
Dennis Frederick. On August 4, 2000, the defendant failed to appear before this court for
sentencing.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Rule 22 states, "On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence." Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 22(b).
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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
Case No. 001909844
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Because defendant and her counsel were both given personal and actual notice of the
August 4, 2000, sentencing date, and the defendant voluntarily failed to appear for her
sentencing, defendant should be sentenced in her absence. Furthermore, the defendant has
waived anyrightto be present by her voluntary absence after being given personal notice in open
court.
ORDER
Based upon defendant's voluntary absence, defendant shall be sentenced in abstentia for
the offense of Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A misdemeanor.
DATED this

W^day of August, 2000.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact,
Conclusions Of Law And Order was delivered to Nina Sisneros, Attorney for Defendant Jon
Donald Hamling, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the

day

of August, 2000.
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ADDENDUM E

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 17. The trial.
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial
with the following exceptions:
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent in writing to trial in his absence;
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial
shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present;

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed.
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any
information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be
issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with
the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, at any time.
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-2Q2(l)(b), the court
shall so specify in the sentencing order.
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.)

CONSHTUTTON OF UTAH

Sec- 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT XIV

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH

2

SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
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STATE OF UTAH,

6
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vs.

PLEA HEARING

TARA AADELE ROGERS,

(Videotape Proceedings')

Defendant.
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10

Case No. 001906958FS

Plaintiff,

5

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 20th day of June,

11

2000, commencing at the hour of 10:49 a.m., the above-

12

entitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE

13

WILLIAM W. BARRETT, sitting as Judge in the above-named

14

Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the

15

following videotape proceedings were had.
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For the State:

KELLY R. SHEFFIELD
Deputy Salt Lake County
District Attorney
231 East 400 South, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

For the Defendant:

NISA J. SISNEROS
Attorney at Law
Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

19
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3

MS. SISNEROS:

4

THE COURT:

5

MS. SISNEROS: And we have a resolution on that,

6

This is Case No. 001906958.

your Honor.

7

THE COURT:

8

MS. SISNEROS:

9

Tara Rogers.

Okay.

What are we doing?

Ms. Rogers will be pleading to an

attempted possession of a controlled substance, Class A.

10

THE COURT:

Okay.

11

Constitutional rights with her?

12

MS. SISNEROS:

13

THE COURT:

Have you gone over her

Yes.

I have, your Honor.

And do you believe the plea will be

14

freely, voluntarily and knowingly given?

15

MS. SISNEROS: Yes.

16

THE COURT:

17

English language?

18

MS. ROGERS:

19

THE COURT:

20

Ms. Rogers, do you understand the

Yes.

I do.

Are you satisfied with the advice

given you by Ms. Sisneros?

21

MS. ROGERS:

22

THE COURT:

Yes.

I am.

You've heard the statements made by

23

her.

Do you intend to plead guilty to this Class A

24

misdemeanor, attempted possession of a controlled

25

substance?

1

MS. ROGERS:

2

THE COURT:

3

MS. ROGERS:

4
5
6

I do.

How long have you been in jail now?
I am going—two weeks, going on

three.
THE COURT:

You're not under the influence of any

drugs or alcohol, are you?

7

MS. ROGERS:

8

THE COURT:

9

Yes.

No, I'm not.
Are you taking any kind of

medication?

10

MS. ROGERS:

No, I'm not.

11

THE COURT:

12

Are you a high school graduate?

13

MS. ROGERS:

14

THE COURT:

15

MS. ROGERS:

No?

Yes, I am.
Where did you go to school?
I went to Cotton—I went to

16

Cottonwood High School and I have brief time at the College

17

of Eastern Utah.

18
19

THE COURT:

presentlyr pending against you; right?

20

MS. ROGERS:

21

THE COURT:

22

And you do understand the charges

Yes.

I do.

And you do also understand that you

have the right to plead not guilty, if you choose?

23

MS. ROGERS:

Yes.

24

THE COURT:

Okay.

Ms. Sisneros has gone over

your Constitutional rights.

I'm going to go over those

25

I do.

3

1

again.

2

rights up by entering a guilty plea.

3

You need to understand that you're giving these

The right to a speedy trial, the right to an

4

impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine

5

witnesses produced by the State and provide a defense.

6

right against self-incrimination, the right to compel

7

witnesses on your own behalf at no cost to you.

8

to proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and if

9

convicted, the right to appeal the conviction.

The right

You also

10

have the presumption of innocence until such time as you

11

enter your guilty plea.

12

Do you understand these rights?

13

MS. ROGERS:

14

THE COURT:

Yes.

I do.

And do you understand that you're

15

giving these rights up by entering a guilty plea to this

16

amended charge?

17

MS. ROGERS:

18

THE COURT:

19

misdemeanor.

20

in jail.

21

85 percent surcharge.

22

MS. ROGERS:

23

THE COURT:

The

Yes.

I do.

Now, you're pleading to a Class A

That means you can be sentenced up to a year

You can also be fined a maximum of $2,500 plus an
Do you understand that?
Yes.

I do.

Did anybody make any promises to you

24

that made you decide to enter a guilty plea to this amended

25

charge?

1

MS. ROGERS:

2

THE COURT:

3

MS. ROGERS:

4

THE COURT:

No, sir.
Did anybody threaten you in any way?
No, sir.
How do you plead to the charge of

5

attempted possession of a controlled substance, a Class A

6

misdemeanor?

Guilty or not guilty?

7

MS. ROGERS:

8

THE COURT:

9

Guilty.
I'll accept your guilty plea at this

time.

10

Would you have her sign the statement, please?

11

Thank you.

12

Based upon the statements made to me by Ms.

13

Sisneros and the answers to my queries from Ms. Rogers, I'm

14

going to find that she freely, voluntarily and knowingly

15

executed this statement and approve it at this time and

16

incorporating this statement by reference, accept her

17

guilty plea, enter a conviction.

18

Will she waive the maximum time for sentencing so

19

we can get a pre-sentence report?

20

MS. SISNEROS:

21

THE CLERK:

August 4th at 8:30, Judge Frederick.

22

THE COURT:

How about her custody status?

23

MS. SISNEROS:

Yes, your Honor.

Your Honor, I talked to Pre-Trial

24

and they've indicated, with the plea, that they would be

25

willing to—to release her.

1

THE COURT:

2

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

3

Is that right?
That is correct, your

Honor.

4

THE COURT:

Okay.

I'm going to release you to

5

Pre-Trial.

6

that you go to Adult Parole & Probation and get that pre-

7

sentence report prepared and then appear before Judge

8

Frederick on the date that was given.

9

You do what they tell you to do, you make sure

MS. SISNEROS:

Okay?

And your Honor, if I may address

10

that?

I have talked to Ms. Rogers about the possibility of

11

doing the pre-sentence report.

12~

the possibility of A.C.E.C. instead of A P & P.

13
14

THE COURT:

MS. SISNEROS:
release.

I can send her to

And I prepared an order of

May I approach?

17

THE COURT:

18

MS. ROGERS:

19

Doesn't matter.

A.C.E.C. if she wants.

15
16

She did want me to request

Uh huh.
So, I will be released this evening,

your Honor, is that correct?

20

THE COURT:

Yeah, you will.

21

MS. SISNEROS:

22

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

Thanks, your Honor.

23
24
25
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

^

I
I

: ss.

II

)

11

I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter,
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape

II
II

Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of
Utah, do certify that I received an electronically recorded
videotape of the within matter and caused the same to be
transcribed into typewriting, and that the foregoing pages,
numbered from 1 to 6, inclusive, to the best of my
knowledge, constitute a full, true and correct
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible.
I do further certify that I am not counsel,
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this JlJLth day of
September,2000.

8

j

TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss.

I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify:
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith,
Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court
Transcriber of Tape Recorded Court Proceedings; that I
received an electronically recorded videotape of the within
matter and under his supervision have transcribed the same
into typewriting, and the foregoing pages, numbered from 1
to 6, inclusive, to the best of my ability constitute a
full, true and correct transcription, except where it is
indicated the Videotape Recorded Court Proceedings were
inaudible.
I do further certify that I am not counsel,
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 12th day of
September, 2000.

Transcriber
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day
of September, 2000.
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